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The (Mis)application of  
Rule 404(b) Heuristics 
DORA W. KLEIN* 
In all of the federal circuit courts of appeals, application 
of Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence has been 
distorted by judicially-created “tests” that, while intended 
to assist trial courts in properly admitting or excluding evi-
dence, do not actually test for the kind of evidence prohibited 
by this rule. Rule 404(b) prohibits evidence of “crimes, 
wrongs, or other acts” if the purpose for admitting the evi-
dence is to prove action in accordance with a character trait. 
This evidence is commonly referred to as “propensity” evi-
dence, or “once a drug dealer, always a drug dealer” evi-
dence.  
This Article examines three counter-productive heuris-
tics that the federal circuit courts of appeals have created: 
(1) multi-factor tests based on a paragraph of dicta from the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Huddleston v. United States; (2) 
a set of “exceptions” based on a misreading of the list of 
permitted purposes for admitting other-acts evidence found 
in Rule 404(b)(2); and (3) a set of additional “exceptions” 
extrapolated from an advisory committee note’s reference to 
“intrinsic” evidence. Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit, in an en banc decision, recognized that 
its approach to Rule 404(b) had become so distorted that a 
new approach was required. This Article concludes that the 
other federal circuit courts of appeals should follow this ex-
ample and proposes that such a reframing of a circuit’s ap-
proach to Rule 404(b) should not require a decision of the 
court en banc. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 *  Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A heuristic is a cognitive shortcut.1 Although some heuristics are 
helpful, the particular heuristics that the federal circuit courts of ap-
peals have created for applying Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence have caused more confusion than clarity. This Article pro-
poses that the courts should abandon these heuristics in favor of an 
approach that is more closely connected to the rule itself. 
Rule 404(b) is perhaps the most controversial of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. Not only is this rule the subject of more appellate 
court opinions than any other rule of evidence,2 it has inspired ex-
tended debate about whether the rule excludes too much or too little 
relevant evidence.3 Additionally, as this Article explains, all of the 
federal courts of appeals have created elaborate, multi-factor “tests” 
of and “exceptions” to Rule 404(b) that add layers of complexity 
and confusion to the rule.4 
Rule 404(b)(1) is intended to prohibit “propensity reasoning,” in 
the language of the common-law cases, or as the rule currently 
reads: “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to 
                                                                                                             
 1 In the realm of the law, heuristics have been defined as “simplistic, rule-
like tests developed by the courts to deal with otherwise complex cases in a more 
efficient manner.” Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 116 
(2012) (quoting Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, 
906 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 2 United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 441 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Rule 404(b) has 
become the most cited evidentiary rule on appeal.”) (citation omitted); cf. FED. R. 
EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment (“Rule 404(b) has 
emerged as one of the most cited Rules in the Rules of Evidence.”). 
 3 Compare Deena Greenberg, Note, Closing Pandora’s Box: Limiting the 
Use of 404(b) to Introduce Prior Convictions in Drug Prosecutions, 50 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 519, 526–27 (2015) (arguing that the rule excludes too little), 
with Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, The Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes 
Evidence and Other Myths of the Criminal Justice Process, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 493, 494 (2011) (arguing that the rule excludes too much evi-
dence). 
 4 See discussion infra Sections II.D.1–12. 
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prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular oc-
casion the person acted in accordance with the character.”5 This is a 
fairly straightforward rule, as the Federal Rules of Evidence go, that 
prohibits one thing: the admission of evidence of “a crime, wrong, 
or other act” for the purpose of proving “a person’s character in or-
der to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accord-
ance with the character.”6 Despite this rule’s relative straightfor-
wardness, the federal circuit courts of appeals have created several 
heuristics that, although intended to simplify application of the rule, 
instead have distorted it so that the test of admissibility of “other 
acts” evidence has little if anything to do with whether the evidence 
is offered to prove action in accordance with character. Like law 
students who acquire armfuls of outlines and supplements that pur-
port to do the work of understanding a case for them, rather than just 
reading the case, these “Rule 404(b) tests” that the federal circuit 
courts of appeals have amassed are a poor substitute for simply ap-
plying the rule itself. 
The Rule 404(b) heuristics can be grouped into three types.7 One 
type of Rule 404(b) heuristic is a multi-factor test based on a para-
graph of dicta from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Huddleston v. 
United States, a case that did not directly concern the task of identi-
fying and excluding propensity evidence.8 In Huddleston, the de-
fendant conceded that the government’s evidence was not offered to 
prove propensity, and so the Rule 404(b) tests that are based on this 
case are not especially helpful when a defendant argues that the gov-
ernment’s evidence is offered to prove propensity.9 Two additional 
types of Rule 404(b) heuristics ask whether the proffered evidence 
satisfies one of the 404(b) “exceptions.” Rule 404(b) itself does not 
include any exceptions; these 404(b) “exceptions” exist only be-
cause the courts have created them.10 One source of these “excep-
tions” is the list of examples of non-propensity purposes included in 
                                                                                                             
 5 FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). 
 6 Id. 
 7 These heuristics are discussed in detail infra Part II. 
 8 485 U.S. 681, 682 (1988). 
 9 Id. at 686. 
 10 Some other rules (specifically, Rules 413, 414, and 415) do establish ex-
ceptions to Rule 404(b), but Rule 404(b) itself does not establish any exceptions. 
FED. R. EVID. 404(b), 413–15. 
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Rule 404(b)(2).11 The second source of these “exceptions” is the ref-
erence, in an advisory committee note, to evidence that is “intrinsic” 
to the charged offense and thus is evidence of the same act rather 
than an “other” act.12 
The purpose of this Article is not to argue that the use of these 
Rule 404(b) heuristics necessarily results in erroneous decisions re-
garding other-acts evidence. The claim of this Article is more lim-
ited: that the use of these Rule 404(b) heuristics results in erroneous 
reasoning by the courts. Courts might (or might not) reach the cor-
rect result to admit (or exclude) evidence by applying these heuris-
tics, but applying these heuristics produces opinions—and as dis-
cussed in Part II.B, exchanges at oral argument—that at best are un-
necessarily confusing and at worst are objectively incorrect state-
ments of the rule. 
Recently, the Seventh Circuit reformed its approach to Rule 
404(b).13 Specifically, this court recognized that Rule 404(b) pro-
hibits one kind of evidence—evidence offered to prove propensity.14 
This Article proposes that the other circuits should similarly aban-
don their Rule 404(b) heuristics and simply apply Rule 404(b) to 
exclude other-acts evidence when offered for the purpose of proving 
action in accordance with character. 
Part I of this Article presents a brief overview of how Rule 
404(b) was intended to operate. Part II examines how Rule 404(b) 
actually operates under the heuristics, focusing on cases decided 
within the last three years. Overall, courts’ application of Rule 
404(b) is woefully confused because, under the Rule 404(b) heuris-
tics, the admissibility of other-acts evidence has come to depend on 
several factors, none of which are the single factor—propensity—
that is provided for in Rule 404(b). Part III briefly reviews each cir-
cuit court of appeals’ approach to Rule 404(b), including the Sev-
enth Circuit’s recent abandonment of the Huddleston and “excep-
tions” heuristics in favor of a more straightforward, rule-based test 
                                                                                                             
 11 FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
 12 FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment (stat-
ing that the rule “does not extend to evidence of acts which are ‘intrinsic’ to the 
charged offense”). 
 13 United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 853 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). This 
case is discussed infra Part III. 
 14 Id. at 855–56. 
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of admissibility under Rule 404(b). Additionally, this Part explains 
why other circuit courts likely do not need to decide a case en banc 
to adopt the Seventh Circuit’s approach. 
I.  THE PURPOSE OF RULE 404(B) 
Rule 404(b) exists because common-law judges feared that ju-
ries would over-value character evidence.15 Character evidence is 
acknowledged to often be relevant; someone who robbed a bank in 
the past is more likely, as compared to someone who has never 
robbed a bank, to be the person who robbed the bank in the present.16 
However, the fact that someone robbed a bank in the past is not con-
clusive proof that this person also robbed a bank in the present, yet 
juries might interpret the prior conduct as proof of present conduct. 
Although it is true that people do often act in accordance with par-
ticular character traits, it is also true that people often act “out-of-
character.” Additionally, a jury might conclude that someone who 
robbed a bank in the past has a bad kind of character and deserves 
to be punished even if she did not commit the present bank robbery. 
It is best, the common-law judges reasoned, to simply remove the 
issue of character from juries’ consideration. As Professor Wigmore 
stated: 
The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal—
whether judge or jury—is to give excessive weight 
to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and ei-
ther to allow it to bear too strongly on the present 
                                                                                                             
 15 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997). 
 16 As the Supreme Court stated in Old Chief: 
Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost unani-
mously have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to any 
kind of evidence of a defendant’s evil character to establish a 
probability of his guilt. . . . The inquiry is not rejected because 
character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too 
much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge 
one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity 
to defend against a particular charge. The overriding policy of 
excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, 
is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent 
confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice. 
Id. at 181 (quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948)). 
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charge, or to take the proof of it as justifying a con-
demnation irrespective of guilt of the present 
charge.17 
Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence reflects this un-
derstanding of the perils of character evidence. According to the Ad-
visory Committee’s Note, the problem with evidence of crimes, 
wrongs, or other acts is that this evidence “subtly permits the trier 
of fact to reward the good man and to punish the bad man because 
of their respective characters despite what the evidence in the case 
shows actually happened.”18 
II.  THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS’ RULE 404(B) 
HEURISTICS 
There are several problems with most federal circuit court of ap-
peals’ approach to Rule 404(b). The first is the crafting of multi-
factor tests that have read the propensity ban on “other acts” evi-
dence out of the rule, on the basis of a paragraph of dicta from the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Huddleston v. United States. The sec-
ond is a fixation on fictitious “exceptions” to Rule 404(b). Some of 
these “exceptions” are based on the permitted purposes listed in 
404(b) and some are based on a reference to “intrinsic” evidence in 
the Advisory Committee’s Note to the 1991 amendment. The result 
is an extensive and confusing assortment of Rule 404(b) “tests” that 
do not in fact test for propensity reasoning. 
A.  Huddleston was Not About Propensity 
One wrong turn that federal courts have taken in applying Rule 
404(b) is to create multi-factor tests of admissibility. The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s test, as stated by one recent case, is typical: 
The government must show that (1) the evidence 
tends to prove a material point; (2) the other act is not 
too remote in time; (3) the evidence is sufficient to 
support a finding that defendant committed the other 
                                                                                                             
 17 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 194, at 646 (3d ed. 1940). 
 18 FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note on proposed rules (citation 
omitted). 
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act; and (4) (in certain cases) the act is similar to the 
offense charged.19 
This test essentially rewrites Rule 404(b) to allow other-acts ev-
idence so long as it is relevant. Nowhere in this test is there any 
consideration of whether the evidence is relevant because it proves 
propensity. This four-factor test might exclude irrelevant evidence, 
or remote evidence, or dissimilar evidence, but it does not neces-
sarily or intentionally exclude propensity evidence. 
Almost all of the other U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have 
adopted n-factor tests similar to the Ninth Circuit’s.20 The similarity 
of these tests stems from their common origin: a paragraph of dicta 
in the opinion of the Supreme Court in Huddleston v. United 
States.21 The Second,22 Third,23 and Tenth24 Circuits even refer to 
the elements of their tests as “Huddleston factors.” 
While Huddleston did concern Rule 404(b), Huddleston himself 
conceded that the government was offering the evidence at issue—
television sets that the government alleged were stolen—for a 
proper purpose.25 As the Court stated, “Petitioner acknowledges that 
this evidence was admitted for the proper purpose of showing his 
                                                                                                             
 19 United States v. Lloyd, 807 F.3d 1128, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). This same formulation is recited in numer-
ous recent Ninth Circuit opinions. See, e.g., United States v. Iturbe-Gonzalez, 679 
F. App’x. 531, 533 (9th Cir. 2017), amended and superseded, 705 F. App’x 486 
(9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Foster, 664 F. App’x 644, 646 (9th Cir. 2016); 
United States v. Tam Quang Do, 617 F. App’x 786, 787 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2015); 
United States v. Martin, 796 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 20 The other U.S. circuits’ approaches are examined infra Part III. 
 21 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988). 
 22 United States v. Samlal, 415 F. App’x 280, 281 (2d Cir. 2011) (“The Hud-
dleston factors were satisfied. . . . Accordingly, we find that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior act evidence and thus affirm the 
judgment of conviction.”). 
 23 United States v. Maurizio, 701 F. App’x 129, 137 (3d Cir. 2017) (“After 
conducting an analysis of the Huddleston factors, the District Court found that the 
evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b).”). 
 24 United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006) (“In sum, the 
district court properly found the evidence satisfied all four Huddleston factors. 
The evidence was thus properly admitted under Rule 404(b).”). 
 25 Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 686. 
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knowledge that the Memorex tapes were stolen.”26 Huddleston ar-
gued that the trial court should have held a pretrial hearing to deter-
mine whether the television sets were in fact stolen,27 and he argued 
that the government should have to prove that the television sets 
were stolen by clear and convincing evidence,28 but he did not argue 
that evidence of the television sets was offered for the purpose of 
proving character or action in accordance with character.29 Rather, 
Huddleston conceded that the television sets were admitted for the 
proper purpose of proving his knowledge that the cases of VCR 
tapes were stolen.30 Because the Supreme Court was not deciding 
whether evidence of the television sets was offered for a proper non-
character purpose, the Court’s opinion should not be taken as a thor-
ough examination of how a trial court should go about determining 
whether evidence of crimes, wrongs, or other acts is admissible un-
der Rule 404(b). Nevertheless, almost all of the U.S. Circuit Courts 
of Appeals have adopted a “Rule 404(b) test” that essentially repeats 
one summative paragraph of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hud-
dleston: 
We share petitioner’s concern that unduly prejudicial 
evidence might be introduced under Rule 404(b). We 
think, however, that the protection against such un-
fair prejudice emanates not from a requirement of a 
preliminary finding by the trial court, but rather from 
four other sources: first, from the requirement of 
Rule 404(b) that the evidence be offered for a proper 
purpose; second, from the relevancy requirement of 
Rule 402—as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, 
from the assessment the trial court must make under 
Rule 403 to determine whether the probative value of 
the similar acts evidence is substantially outweighed 
by its potential for unfair prejudice, and fourth, from 
                                                                                                             
 26 Id. 
 27 This was the issue that the Supreme Court agreed to decide. Id. at 685 (“We 
granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether 
the trial court must make a preliminary finding before ‘similar act’ and other Rule 
404(b) evidence is submitted to the jury.”) (citation omitted). 
 28 Id. at 684. 
 29 Id. at 686. 
 30 Id. 
716 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:706 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which provides that 
the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury 
that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only 
for the proper purpose for which it was admitted.31 
In this paragraph, the Supreme Court was not articulating a test 
for determining when evidence of crimes, wrongs, or other acts is 
admissible for a non-character or non-propensity purpose. The 
Court’s only acknowledgement of the heart of Rule 404(b)—pro-
pensity—is the cursory reference to the requirement that “the evi-
dence be offered for a proper purpose.”32 The Court did not explain 
how a trial court should determine whether evidence is being offered 
for a proper purpose. In using this dicta as a basis for a general test 
of Rule 404(b) admissibility, federal courts have sidestepped the 
question that must be asked before turning to the factors that the 
Court listed. Because the factors the Court listed do not instruct trial 
courts how to determine whether evidence is offered for a non-char-
acter purpose, the tests based on these factors do not clearly or nec-
essarily protect against the admission of evidence for the purpose of 
proving action in accordance with character. 
B.  Examples are Not Exceptions 
Rule 404(b)(1) states: “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act 
is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that 
on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the 
character.”33 This straightforward prohibition of propensity evi-
dence has been confused, however, by Rule 404(b)(2), which pro-
vides a long list of examples of “permitted uses,” including “proving 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”34 Many federal courts have 
interpreted this list not as examples of permitted purposes but as 
specifically enumerated exceptions, with the result that trial courts 
undertake to determine the admissibility of other-acts evidence by 
asking whether the evidence “fits” an “exception,” not whether the 
evidence is offered for the purpose of proving propensity. 
                                                                                                             
 31 Id. at 691–92 (footnote and citations omitted). 
 32 Id. at 691. 
 33 FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). 
 34 FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
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The Ninth Circuit is a particularly egregious transgressor. An 
examination of cases decided in that circuit in the past three years 
reveals that the examples of permitted purposes listed in Rule 
404(b)(2) are routinely described as “exceptions.” For example, the 
court has stated that “Rule 404(b)(2) functions as an exception to 
404(b)(1)”35 and that “[w]hen the Government offers evidence of 
prior or subsequent crimes or bad acts as part of its case-in-chief, it 
has the burden of first establishing relevance of the evidence to 
prove a fact within one of the exceptions to the general exclusionary 
rule of Rule 404(b).”36 
The Ninth Circuit has also taken to naming various exceptions, 
such as the “plan exception,”37 the “identity exception,”38 and “the 
inextricably intertwined exception.”39 In one recent case, the judges 
spent several minutes of oral argument attempting to determine 
whether appellant’s counsel had waived by failing to argue on ap-
peal “one of the exceptions” because she had not specifically named 
it in her brief.40 The very first question, asked by Judge Nelson, in-
volved “the 404(b) exceptions”: “Trial counsel focused on the plan 
exception, and appeal counsel focused on a mistaken identity. What 
are you focusing on?” Appellate counsel responded that it didn’t 
matter which label was applied to the evidence.41 Judge Wardlaw 
disagreed with this response, stating, “Well, they are two different 
exceptions,” and “No, it’s two different things.”42 Continuing this 
attraction to if not fixation on the “exceptions,” the court’s opinion 
begins with the statement: “In his opening brief, Firempong argues 
only that Dr. Owens’ testimony was admissible under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 404(b)(2)’s ‘identity’ exception. Thus, to the extent that 
                                                                                                             
 35 United States v. McElmurry, 776 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 36 United States v. Wolverine, 584 F. App’x 646, 647 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 
United States v. Hernandez–Miranda, 601 F.2d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir.1979)). 
 37 United States v. Firempong, 624 F. App’x 497, 499 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 38 Id. 
 39 United States v. Sangalang, 580 F. App’x 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 40 Firempong, 624 F. App’x at 499. The video of the oral argument in this 
case is available on the court’s website. Watch Recording for Case: USA v. Owusu 
Firempong, No. 14-50118, U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, 
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000008048 (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Firempong Oral Argument]. 
 41 Firempong Oral Argument, supra note 40, at 0:33. 
 42 Id. at 1:37. 
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Owens’ testimony may have been admissible under Rule 
404(b)(2)’s ‘plan’ exception, this argument is waived.”43 
The problem with this approach is that whether the purpose for 
admitting the evidence is or is not listed in Rule 404(b)(2) is irrele-
vant; what matters is whether the purpose for offering the evidence 
is to prove propensity. It is confusing and potentially misleading to 
focus on whether the evidence is “plan evidence” or “identity evi-
dence” when what matters is whether the evidence is propensity ev-
idence. 
In sum, the essential flaw in the Ninth Circuit’s approach to Rule 
404(b)44 is that the permitted purposes listed in 404(b)(2) are not a 
list of exceptions; they are a list of examples. Misinterpreting the 
examples as exceptions has caused the court to ask whether evidence 
of crimes wrongs, or other acts “fits” one of the listed “exceptions,” 
not whether it is propensity evidence, with the result that the court’s 
test for admissibility is not the test provided by the rule. 
C.  Evidence Not Covered by a Rule Is Not Admissible as an 
Exception to the Rule 
The third distorting Rule 404(b) heuristic that the federal courts 
have created is based on the Advisory Committee’s Note to the 1991 
amendment, which states: “The amendment does not extend to evi-
dence of acts which are ‘intrinsic’ to the charged offense.”45 While 
there is nothing inherently objectionable about this commentary, the 
problem is that federal courts have used this language to identify 
several additional “exceptions” to Rule 404(b), including not only 
an “intrinsic evidence exception” but also a “res gestae exception,” 
an “intertwined (or in some cases “inextricably intertwined”) excep-
tion,” a “background exception,” and a “completing the story excep-
tion.” 
Most of the circuit courts of appeals have created some “excep-
tion” based on the advisory committee’s reference to “intrinsic” ev-
idence. The most common is perhaps the “inextricably intertwined 
exception.” For example, the Fifth Circuit recently stated: 
                                                                                                             
 43 Firempong, 624 F. App’x at 499 (citation omitted). 
 44 The Ninth Circuit might be the worst transgressor, but it is not the only 
one; the other U.S. circuits’ “exceptions” heuristics are discussed infra Part III. 
 45 FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment (cita-
tion omitted). 
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Here, we conclude that the evidence of Judge Co-
bos’s bribe was intrinsic because it was “inextricably 
intertwined” with the conspiracy to defraud the 
United States in that it completed the story of the 
crime by proving the immediate context of events in 
time and place, allowing the jury to assess all of the 
circumstances under which Madrid and Garcia 
acted.46 
Similarly, according to the Ninth Circuit: “The uncharged trans-
actions were ‘intrinsic’ to the charged counts of wire fraud as they 
were all part of a single scheme; therefore, evidence of the un-
charged transactions was also admissible under the ‘inextricably in-
tertwined’ exception to Rule 404(b).”47 
Another “exception” related to “intrinsic” evidence is the “res 
gestae exception.” As the Sixth Circuit recently stated: “Res gestae 
evidence, also described as ‘background’ or ‘intrinsic’ evidence, is 
‘an exception’ to the Rule 404(b) bar on propensity evidence.”48 
Some federal courts recognize a related “complete-the-story excep-
tion.” For example, according to the Fourth Circuit: 
The intrinsic act doctrine allows evidence of bad acts 
to be admitted if the acts arose out of the same series 
of transactions as the charged offense, or if the evi-
dence is necessary to complete the story of the crime 
on trial. Other criminal acts are intrinsic when they 
are inextricably intertwined or both acts are part of a 
                                                                                                             
 46 United States v. Madrid, 610 F. App’x 359, 385 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation 
and alterations omitted); accord United States v. Ebert, 178 F.3d 1287, 1999 WL 
261590, at *25 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (discussing the “in-
extricably intertwined exception to Rule 404(b)”). 
 47 United States v. Cuenca, 692 F. App’x 857, 858 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 48 United States v. Gibbs, 797 F.3d 416, 423 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation omit-
ted); accord United States v. Hughes, 562 F. App’x 393, 396 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The 
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that this other-acts evi-
dence was intrinsic to the charged offenses and therefore came within the back-
ground or res gestae evidence exception to Rule 404(b).”); United States v. Ad-
ams, 722 F.3d 788, 810 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Background or res gestae evidence is 
an exception to Rule 404(b).”) (citation omitted). 
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single criminal episode or the other acts were neces-
sary preliminaries to the crime charged.49 
The Eleventh Circuit similarly stated: 
Evidence of uncharged criminal activities is inadmis-
sible unless the uncharged acts arose from the same 
transaction, are necessary to complete the story of the 
crime, or are inextricably intertwined with the evi-
dence regarding the charged offense. Even if the ev-
idence meets one of these exceptions, it may still be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.50 
These various “exceptions” that federal courts have spun out of 
the Advisory Committee’s reference to “intrinsic” evidence are 
problematic for two reasons. First, it is conceptually wrong to say 
that evidence is admissible pursuant to an exception if the evidence 
is truly intrinsic evidence—if the rule does not extend to the evi-
dence, then the evidence is not an exception to the rule; the rule 
simply does not apply to the evidence. 
Additionally, not only do these “exceptions” confuse the ques-
tion whether evidence is admissible for a non-propensity purpose, 
the “exceptions” also confuse the question whether evidence is sub-
ject to the notice requirement of Rule 404(b).51 If the evidence is 
truly intrinsic, then it is not other-act evidence and should not be 
subject to the notice requirement. Federal courts, however, disagree 
about whether this “res gestae” or “inextricably intertwined” or 
“completes the story” evidence is intrinsic or extrinsic. For example, 
the Eighth Circuit has called it intrinsic: “Evidence of other wrong-
ful conduct is considered intrinsic when it is offered for the purpose 
of providing the context in which the charged crime occurred. Such 
evidence is admitted because the other crime evidence ‘completes 
                                                                                                             
 49 United States v. Francis, 329 F. App’x 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations, 
alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 50 United States v. Daniel, 173 F. App’x 766, 769 (11th Cir. 2006) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 51 FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (“On request by a defendant in a criminal case, the 
prosecutor must: (A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such 
evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial; and (B) do so before trial — 
or during trial if the court, for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.”). 
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the story’ or provides a ‘total picture’ of the charged crime.”52 The 
Fifth Circuit, however, has said that it is extrinsic: “The Government 
contends that the evidence regarding Torres’ involvement in the rob-
beries and Guerrero’s connection to him was admissible because it 
completes the story of the crime. Pursuant to Rule 404(b), our court 
has approved such extrinsic evidence.”53 
These “exceptions” have shifted the federal courts’ focus from 
determining whether evidence is offered for a propensity purpose to 
determining whether one of the “exceptions” applies. Several courts 
have acknowledged that “inextricably intertwined,” “res gestae,” 
“background,” and “completes the story” are concepts without clear 
boundaries. For example, the D.C. Circuit has stated: “The ‘com-
plete the story’ definition of ‘inextricably intertwined’ threatens to 
override Rule 404(b).”54 The Third Circuit similarly has observed: 
“Like its predecessor res gestae, the inextricably intertwined test is 
vague, overbroad, and prone to abuse, and we cannot ignore the dan-
ger it poses to the vitality of Rule 404(b).”55 The Seventh Circuit 
also recognized the confusion created by the “inextricably inter-
twined exception”; however, its solution was simply to shift the con-
fusion to another “exception,” stating that  “[b]ecause motive is an 
express exception to the Rule 404(b) bar, there is no need to spread 
the fog of inextricably intertwined over it.”56 Courts should abandon 
the “fog” inherent in all of the “exceptions” and return to the test set 
forth in Rule 404(b) itself. 
D.  Current Approaches to Rule 404(b) in the Circuit Courts of 
Appeals 
The following subsections summarize each circuit court of ap-
peals’ (mis)use of three Rule 404(b) heuristics: the n-factor Huddle-
                                                                                                             
 52 United States v. Johnson, 463 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 53 United States v. Guerrero, 169 F.3d 933, 943 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations 
omitted). 
 54 United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 55 United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 248 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 56 United States v. Schmitt, 770 F.3d 524, 533 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations, al-
terations, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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ston heuristic; the “enumerated exceptions” heuristic; and the “in-
trinsic acts exceptions” heuristic. The analysis focuses on cases de-
cided within the past three years. 
1.  THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
a. The n-Factor Huddleston Heuristic 
The First Circuit presently has one of the more abbreviated Rule 
404(b) tests, consisting only of two factors, one of which is not even 
about Rule 404(b) but instead is about Rule 403. According to the 
court: “We utilize a two-part test in evaluating admissibility under 
Rule 404(b). First, we ask whether the evidence has ‘special rele-
vance’; then, we apply Rule 403 and consider whether its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice.”57 
The first part of this test is based on Huddleston. As the court 
recently stated: 
The Supreme Court has explained that, in evaluating 
the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence, a court in-
itially must decide whether the evidence submitted is 
probative of a material issue other than character. 
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686 
(1988). To implement this directive, we have re-
quired that Rule 404(b) evidence be shown to have 
special relevance to an issue in the case such as intent 
or knowledge.58 
b.  The “Enumerated Exceptions” Heuristic 
It might be thought that asking whether evidence has “special 
relevance” would entail a determination whether evidence is offered 
for a non-character purpose. Although this might have been the goal, 
in practice it amounts to asking whether the proponent of the evi-
dence has said that the evidence is being offered for one of the ex-
amples of permitted purposes included in Rule 404(b)(2). For exam-
ple, the First Circuit recently stated: “Rule 404(b)(2) specifically 
                                                                                                             
 57 United States v. Ford, 839 F.3d 94, 109 (1st Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 
 58 United States v. Raymond, 697 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2012) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
2018] THE (MIS)APPLICATION OF RULE 404(B) HEURISTICS 723 
 
permits the admission of a prior conviction to prove intent, and we 
have repeatedly upheld the admission of prior drug dealing by a de-
fendant to prove a present intent to distribute.”59 More generally, the 
court views Rule 404(b)(2)’s list of permitted purposes to be an “ex-
ception” to 404(b)(1): 
Rule 404(b)(1) states that “[e]vidence of a crime, 
wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a per-
son’s character in order to show that on a particular 
occasion the person acted in accordance with the 
character.” However, Rule 404(b)(2) provides for an 
exception, stating that such “evidence may be admis-
sible for another purpose, such as proving motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”60 
Adding insult to injury, the First Circuit has stated that these 
“exceptions” are applied “broadly.” For example, the court recently 
explained that “when the other-acts evidence is introduced to show 
knowledge, motive, or intent, the Rule 404(b) exceptions to the pro-
hibition against character evidence have been construed broadly.”61 
c.  The “Intrinsic Evidence Exceptions” Heuristic 
Although it relies heavily on the “enumerated exceptions” heu-
ristic, the First Circuit has largely avoided the “intrinsic acts excep-
tion” heuristic. In numerous recent cases, the court has properly de-
fined “intrinsic evidence” as evidence of the charged offense, as op-
posed to evidence of “other acts,” and has avoided referring to this 
“same act” evidence as an “exception” to Rule 404(b). For example, 
it recently stated: 
                                                                                                             
 59 United States v. Henry, 848 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2017) (citations omitted); 
accord id. at 9 (stating that “the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling 
that the prior-conviction evidence qualified under the intent exception to Rule 
404(b)”). 
 60 United States v. Monteiro, 871 F.3d 99, 110 n.7 (1st Cir. 2017), petition 
for cert. filed, No. 17-8041 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2018). 
 61 United States v. Rodríguez-Soler, 773 F.3d 289, 298 (1st Cir. 2014) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Flores Perez, 849 F.2d 1, 
4 (1st Cir. 1988)). 
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Rule 404(b)’s prohibition of evidence of prior bad 
acts applies to evidence that is extrinsic to the crime 
charged, and is introduced for the purpose of show-
ing villainous propensity. But when the evidence 
presented is intrinsic to the crime charged in the in-
dictment Rule 404(b) is really not implicated at all.62 
2.  THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
a.  The n-Factor Huddleston Heuristic 
The Second Circuit currently follows a Huddleston-inspired 
four-factor test that is nearly identical to the Ninth Circuit’s test:63 
This Court applies the inquiry in Huddleston v. 
United States in order to determine whether a district 
court properly admitted other act evidence. Under 
that inquiry, the reviewing court considers whether 
(1) it was offered for a proper purpose; (2) it was rel-
evant to a material issue in dispute; (3) its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect; and (4) the trial court gave an appropriate lim-
iting instruction to the jury if so requested by the de-
fendant.64 
As with most circuits’ tests, this test provides no guidance con-
cerning the key Rule 404(b) question—how to determine whether 
the evidence is offered for a proper purpose. Under this test, the trial 
court must determine that the evidence is “offered for a proper pur-
pose,” but the test does not further state that a proper purpose exists 
only when the relevance of the evidence does not depend upon a 
propensity inference. 
                                                                                                             
 62 Monteiro, 871 F.3d at 110 (citations, alterations, and internal quotation 
marks omitted); accord United States v. DeSimone, 699 F.3d 113, 124 (1st Cir. 
2012) (“Evidence intrinsic to the crime for which the defendant is charged and is 
on trial is not governed by Rule 404(b).”) (citation omitted). 
 63 See supra Section II.A. 
 64 United States v. Alcantara, 674 F. App’x 27, 30 (2d Cir. 2016) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Barret, 677 F. 
App’x 21, 23–24 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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b.  The “Enumerated Exceptions” Heuristic 
Generally, the Second Circuit properly states that all evidence 
that is not propensity evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b). For 
example, the court recently stated that “prior act evidence is admis-
sible if offered for any purpose other than to show a defendant’s 
criminal propensity.”65 On occasion, however, the Second Circuit 
has referred to one of the listed examples of permitted purposes as a 
particular kind of exception. For example, the court has referred to 
“the proof of motive exception”66 and “the opportunity exception.”67 
c.  The “Intrinsic Evidence Exceptions” Heuristic 
The Second Circuit often states that evidence intrinsic to the 
charged offense is not “other act” evidence and therefore is not gov-
erned by Rule 404(b). The court has repeated in numerous cases: 
Evidence of uncharged criminal activity is not con-
sidered other crimes evidence if it arose out of the 
same transaction or series of transactions as the 
charged offense, if it is inextricably intertwined with 
the evidence regarding the charged offense, or if it is 
necessary to complete the story of the crime on 
trial.68 
While this definition of “other crimes” evidence avoids the im-
proper “exceptions” conception of some other circuits’ approaches, 
the Second Circuit’s test does—like the circuits that use the “excep-
tions” approach—broaden the scope of intrinsic evidence to include 
not just evidence of the charged act but also evidence that is “inex-
tricably intertwined” with or needed to “complete the story” of that 
act. For example, the court recently stated: 
                                                                                                             
 65 United States v. Dupree, 870 F.3d 62, 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (citation and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Gill v. United States, 
No. 17-7828 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2018). 
 66 Sims v. Blot, 354 F. App’x 504, 507 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 67 United States v. Slaughter, 248 F. App’x 210, 212 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 68 United States v. Lyle, 856 F.3d 191, 206 (2d Cir. 2017) (citations,                
alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted), petition for cert. filed, No. 17-
5992 (U.S. Sept. 14, 2017); accord United States v. Fama, 636 F. App’x 45, 47–
48 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Morillo-Vidal, 547 F. App’x 29, 31 (2d Cir. 
2013); United States v. Alvarez, 541 F. App’x 80, 85 (2d Cir. 2013). 
726 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:706 
 
We have explained that evidence of uncharged crim-
inal conduct, if it is “inextricably intertwined with 
the evidence regarding the charged offense,” is not 
evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” under 
Rule 404(b). Rather, if it “completes the story of the 
crime on trial,” then the evidence of the uncharged 
act is properly treated as part of the very act charged, 
or, at least, as proof of that act.69 
3.  THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
a.  The n-Factor Huddleston Heuristic 
Many Third Circuit opinions recite that the court applies a Hud-
dleston four-factor test. One recent example states: 
Admissibility under Rule 404(b) requires the satis-
faction of four distinct steps: (1) the other-acts evi-
dence must be proffered for a non-propensity pur-
pose; (2) that evidence must be relevant to the iden-
tified non-propensity purpose; (3) its probative value 
must not be substantially outweighed by its potential 
for causing unfair prejudice to the defendant; and (4) 
if requested, the other-acts evidence must be accom-
panied by a limiting instruction. See Huddleston v. 
United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988).70 
However, several other recent decisions have focused specifi-
cally on whether evidence is relevant for a non-character purpose 
and whether that relevance exists independent of any propensity rea-
soning. One case that acknowledges the inadequacy of the four-fac-
tor test and advocates a closer examination of whether other-acts 
evidence is offered for a propensity purpose is United States v. Cald-
well.71 In this case, the Third Circuit stated: 
In proffering prior act evidence, the government 
must explain how the evidence fits into a chain of 
                                                                                                             
 69 Fama, 636 F. App’x at 47–48 (citations, alterations, and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 70 United States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 230, 241 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 71 760 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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inferences—a chain that connects the evidence to a 
proper purpose, no link of which is a forbidden pro-
pensity inference. We require that this chain be artic-
ulated with careful precision because, even when a 
non-propensity purpose is “at issue” in a case, the ev-
idence offered may be completely irrelevant to that 
purpose, or relevant only in an impermissible way. 
The Government argues that Caldwell’s prior con-
victions are relevant to show his knowledge, yet it 
has failed to satisfactorily explain why this is so. 
There is in the record no articulation by the Govern-
ment of a logical chain of inferences showing how 
Caldwell’s prior convictions are relevant to show his 
knowledge. Nor does the Government present such a 
chain of logical inferences in its argument on appeal. 
Instead, the Government repeatedly returns to its 
baseline position that the evidence is generally rele-
vant to show Caldwell’s knowledge that he pos-
sessed the gun. This tells us nothing about how the 
evidence accomplishes this task, and is insufficient 
to secure admission under Rule 404(b).72 
The court concluded: 
In sum, we conclude that the admission under Rule 
404(b) of Caldwell’s prior convictions for unlawful 
firearm possession was erroneous and that the error 
was not harmless. While it may be that this opinion 
breaks no new ground, we believe it necessary to re-
iterate the importance of a methodical approach by 
the proponent of prior act evidence and a carefully 
reasoned ruling by the trial judge who must decide 
the question of admissibility.73 
The Third Circuit has reaffirmed this more rule-based approach 
in additional recent cases. For example: 
                                                                                                             
 72 Id. at 281 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73 Id. at 290. 
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We have recently reiterated the importance of con-
cretely connecting the proffered evidence to a non-
propensity purpose. . . . [T]he Government failed to 
articulate a chain of inferences supporting the admis-
sion of Repak’s uncharged solicitations. Instead, the 
Government stated only that a logical chain connect-
ing the evidence to a non-propensity purpose exists. 
That statement is not enough to demonstrate the ad-
missibility of Rule 404(b) evidence. The District 
Court should have asked the Government to explain 
how the proffered evidence should work in the mind 
of a juror to establish Repak’s knowledge and intent 
related to the roof and excavation services.74 
Aside from the Seventh Circuit’s 2014 en banc decision in 
United States v. Gomez, which explicitly acknowledged the inade-
quacies of the n-factor Huddleston test and adopted a more rule-
based test,75 the Third Circuit’s opinion in Caldwell is perhaps the 
clearest statement of how trial judges should decide whether to ad-
mit other-acts evidence under Rule 404(b). 
b.  The “Enumerated Exceptions” Heuristic 
Despite the Caldwell Court’s recognition that Rule 404(b) re-
quires a propensity-free chain of reasoning, the court also explicitly 
embraced the idea that the examples of permitted uses function like 
exceptions, stating: “The ‘permitted uses’ of prior act evidence set 
forth in Rule 404(b)(2) are treated like exceptions to this rule of ex-
clusion.”76 Similarly, the court has stated: “‘Knowledge’ and ‘in-
tent’ are also both exceptions under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) 
permitting the use of the defendant’s prior ‘Crimes, Wrongs, or 
Other Acts.’”77 
                                                                                                             
 74 Repak, 852 F.3d at 243–44 (citations and internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 75 The Gomez case is discussed infra Part III. 
 76 Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276. 
 77 United States v. Sussman, 709 F.3d 155, 174–75 n. 21 (3d Cir. 2013); ac-
cord United States v. Ushery, 400 F. App’x 674, 677 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]e do 
not begin to balance the evidence’s probative value under Rule 401 against Rule 
403 considerations unless the evidence is offered under one of the Rule 404(b) 
exceptions.”) (citation omitted). 
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Despite these statements, the Third Circuit does not use the 
“enumerated exceptions heuristic” as a means to determine the ad-
missibility of evidence nearly so much as some other circuits. Addi-
tionally, the court is not generally using the “enumerated excep-
tions” as a fast-track to admitting evidence. For example, after the 
Caldwell Court observed that the enumerated examples of permitted 
purposes “are treated like exceptions,” the court then stated: 
Our opinions have repeatedly and consistently em-
phasized that the burden of identifying a proper pur-
pose rests with the proponent of the evidence, usually 
the government. This hurdle is not insurmountable, 
but it must be satisfied before the exception can be 
invoked . . . . Once the proponent identifies a non-
propensity purpose that is “at issue” in the case, the 
proponent must next explain how the evidence is rel-
evant to that purpose. This step is crucial. The task is 
not merely to find a pigeonhole in which the proof 
might fit, but to actually demonstrate that the evi-
dence proves something other than propensity.78 
Given this proper statement regarding the need to exercise care 
in applying the “exceptions,” it is not clear why the court does not 
take the next logical step and reject the “exceptions” heuristic alto-
gether. 
c. The “Intrinsic Evidence Exceptions” Heuristic 
The Third Circuit has specifically rejected the “intrinsically in-
tertwined” heuristic. In the 2010 case United States v. Green, the 
court undertook an extensive analysis of the “inextricably inter-
twined” test.79 The court observed: 
There are at least three problems with the “inextrica-
bly intertwined” test and its subsidiary formulations. 
The first is that the test creates confusion because, 
quite simply, no one knows what it means. Such an 
impediment stands as an obstacle to helpful analysis. 
                                                                                                             
 78 Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276 (citations, alterations, and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 79 617 F.3d 233, 246–48 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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Indeed, we have criticized the “inextricably inter-
twined” standard as “a definition that elucidates lit-
tle.” . . . . 
The second problem with the inextricably inter-
twined test is that resort to it is unnecessary. . . . [T]he 
same evidence would also be admissible within the 
framework of that rule because allowing the jury to 
understand the circumstances surrounding the 
charged crime—completing the story—is a proper, 
non-propensity purpose under Rule 404(b). All that 
is accomplished by labeling evidence “intrinsic” is 
relieving the Government from providing a defend-
ant with the procedural protections of Rule 404(b). 
The third problem with the inextricably intertwined 
test is that some of its broader formulations, taken at 
face value, classify evidence of virtually any bad act 
as intrinsic.80 
Finally, the court concluded that “the inextricably intertwined 
test is vague, overbroad, and prone to abuse, and we cannot ignore 
the danger it poses to the vitality of Rule 404(b).”81 
4.  THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
a.  The n-Factor Huddleston Heuristic 
The Fourth Circuit’s three-part, Huddleston-based test provides: 
“Under Rule 404(b), evidence of other bad acts is admissible only if 
it is ‘probative of a material issue other than character.’ Huddleston 
v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686 (1988).” Such evidence is 
properly admitted when it is (1) relevant to an issue other than char-
acter, (2) necessary, and (3) reliable.”82 As previously discussed, the 
problem with this test is that factor one is the only factor that re-
motely relates to Rule 404(b)’s prohibition of propensity evidence, 
but requiring that evidence be “relevant to an issue other than char-
acter” in no way guarantees that the relevance to the non-character 
                                                                                                             
 80 Id. (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 81 Id. at 248. 
 82 United States v. Oaks, 185 F. App’x 298, 300 (4th Cir. 2006). 
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issue does not rely on character inferences. For example, evidence 
of a prior drug conviction may be relevant to proving the issue of 
intent by relying on the inference that the defendant is the kind of 
person who intends to commit drug offenses. 
b.  The “Enumerated Exceptions” Heuristic 
The Fourth Circuit occasionally relies on the examples of per-
mitted purposes listed in Rule 404(b)(2) to determine whether evi-
dence is offered for a purpose other than to prove character. For ex-
ample, the court has stated: “Teran’s prior firearms conviction is ad-
missible under the ‘intent’ exception to bad character evidence. Be-
cause Teran pled not-guilty to possession of a firearm, any past fire-
arm conviction was relevant as to his intent.”83 More generally, the 
court has expressly embraced the “enumerated exceptions” heuris-
tic, stating: 
Although prior “bad act” evidence is inadmissible 
under Rule 404(b) to demonstrate a defendant’s bad 
character, such evidence is not always barred from 
the trial altogether. The Rule itself provides a number 
of exceptions allowing for the admission of prior 
“bad act” evidence, including evidence of “proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, [and] absence of mistake or ac-
cident.”84 
c.  The “Intrinsic Evidence Exceptions” Heuristic 
The Fourth Circuit has adopted a variety of versions of the “in-
extricably intertwined” approach to “intrinsic” evidence. Like other 
circuits, the Fourth Circuit has defined “inextricably intertwined” to 
include evidence that “completes the story.”85 The court also has 
                                                                                                             
 83 United States v. Teran, 496 F. App’x 287, 293 n.* (4th Cir. 2012) (citation 
omitted); accord United States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 659, 663 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(“Rule 404(b) explicitly allows evidence that furnishes proof of the defendant’s 
knowledge and the absence of mistake or accident.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 84 United States v. McBride, 676 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omit-
ted) (alteration in original). 
 85 See, e.g., United States v. Logan, 593 F. App’x 179, 183 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(“Evidence of uncharged conduct is not other crimes evidence subject to Rule 
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used a “context” definition; for example, the court has stated: “Evi-
dence is intrinsic if it is necessary to provide context relevant to the 
criminal charges.”86 Additionally, the court has created a “necessary 
preliminaries” definition; for example, in several recent cases the 
Fourth Circuit has stated: “Other bad acts are intrinsic—as opposed 
to extrinsic—when those acts are inextricably intertwined or both 
acts are part of a single criminal episode or the other acts were nec-
essary preliminaries to the crime charged.”87 It is not clear whether 
(or how) “completes the story,” “context,” and “necessary prelimi-
naries” differ from each other, or whether any of these definitions 
differ from the typical “background” definition used by other cir-
cuits. 
5.  THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
a.  The n-Factor Huddleston Heuristic 
Like the First Circuit, the Fifth Circuit applies a two-factor test 
that combines Huddleston’s reference to relevance to a non-charac-
ter issue with Rule 403: 
Evidence of an uncharged crime or other act must be 
sufficient to support a finding that the crime or act 
actually occurred. If evidence of the crime or act is 
sufficient, its admissibility under Rule 404(b) hinges 
on whether (1) it is relevant to an issue other than the 
defendant’s character, and (2) it possesses probative 
value that is not substantially outweighed by its un-
due prejudice under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.88 
                                                                                                             
404 . . . if evidence of the uncharged conduct is necessary to complete the story 
of the crime on trial.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86 United States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 308, 326 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 87 United States v. Sterling, 701 F. App’x 196, 206 (4th Cir. 2017) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Logan, 593 F. App’x at 183; United 
States v. Marfo, 572 F. App’x 215, 223, 226 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 88 United States v. Thomas, 847 F.3d 193, 207 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
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b.  The “Enumerated Exceptions” Heuristic 
The Fifth Circuit on occasion relies on Rule 404(b)(2)’s list of 
examples (“exceptions”) in determining whether evidence is rele-
vant for a non-character purpose. For example, the court has stated 
that “intent is a permitted use of extrinsic evidence under 
404(b)(2)”89 and “Rule 404(b)(2) includes an exception to the pro-
pensity evidence ban to demonstrate knowledge or lack of mis-
take.”90 
Despite such examples of the court’s use of the “enumerated ex-
ceptions” heuristic, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that this heuris-
tic is an incorrect application of the rule: 
Generally, Rule 404(b)(1) excludes evidence of a 
person’s past misdeeds if the sole value of such evi-
dence is to prove the existence of a trait of character, 
and, from that trait, an inference of particular con-
duct. The rule then provides what is mistakenly de-
scribed as an exception to this general bar on propen-
sity evidence: Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other 
act may be admissible for another purpose, such as 
proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or 
lack of accident. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).91 
c.  The “Intrinsic Evidence Exceptions” Heuristic 
The Fifth Circuit uses an assortment of “inextricably inter-
twined” definitions that is similar to the Fourth Circuit’s. For exam-
ple, the court has used the “context,” “necessary preliminaries,” and 
“completes the story” definitions of “intrinsic”: 
Evidence is “intrinsic” when the evidence of the 
other act and the evidence of the crime charged are 
“inextricably intertwined,” if both acts are part of a 
                                                                                                             
 89 United States v. Rojas, 812 F.3d 382, 405 (5th Cir. 2016); accord United 
States v. Smith, 804 F.3d 724, 736 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating that “an uncharged 
offense is relevant to intent, a proper non-character issue under Rule 404(b)”) (ci-
tation omitted). 
 90 Brewer v. Hayne, 860 F.3d 819, 825 n.25 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 91 United States v. Gutierrez-Mendez, 752 F.3d 418, 423 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(footnotes and citation omitted). 
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“single criminal episode,” or if the other acts were 
“necessary preliminaries” to the crime charged. In-
trinsic evidence is admissible to complete the story 
of the crime by proving the immediate context of 
events in time and place, and to evaluate all of the 
circumstances under which the defendant acted, and 
thus does not implicate Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).92 
6.  THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
a.  The n-Factor Huddleston Heuristic 
The Sixth Circuit generally follows a three-part test: 
Trial courts employ a three-part test to determine the 
admissibility of 404(b)(2) evidence. First, a court de-
termines whether there is sufficient evidence that the 
crime, wrong, or other act took place. Second, it de-
cides whether evidence of that conduct is offered for 
a proper purpose, i.e., whether the evidence is proba-
tive of a material issue other than character. Third, 
the court considers whether any risk of unfair preju-
dice substantially outweighs the evidence’s proba-
tive value.93 
b.  The “Enumerated Exceptions” Heuristic 
Like most circuits, the Sixth Circuit has relied on Rule 404(b)(2) 
to determine whether evidence was offered for a proper purpose. For 
example, the court has stated: “The government offered Richard-
son’s prior distribution conviction for the purpose of proving his in-
tent to distribute crack in this case, and Rule 404(b) expressly per-
mits prior bad act evidence to be used to prove intent.”94 More gen-
erally, the court has stated that Rule 404(b)(2) creates “exceptions” 
to Rule 404(b)(1): “Rule 404(b)(2) provides exceptions to Rule 
                                                                                                             
 92 United States v. Madrid, 610 F. App’x 359, 385 (5th Cir. 2015) (citations, 
alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 93 United States v. Barnes, 822 F.3d 914, 920 (6th Cir. 2016) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 94 United States v. Richardson, 597 F. App’x 328, 333 (6th Cir. 2015) (cita-
tion omitted). 
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404(b)(1); these exceptions permit the Government to offer evi-
dence of ‘a crime, wrong, or other act’ in limited circumstances—to 
prove ‘motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.’”95 
In some cases, however, the Sixth Circuit has not only asked 
whether the evidence was offered for a purpose listed in Rule 
404(b)(2) but has also asked whether the evidence’s relevance for 
that purpose relies on a propensity inference. For example, in the 
same case in which it summarily said that intent is expressly listed 
as a proper purpose in Rule 404(b)(2), the court also stated: 
Where the district court erred was in finding that 
Richardson’s prior distribution was probative of his 
intent to distribute in this case. Generally, where the 
crime charged is one requiring specific intent, the 
prosecutor may use 404(b) evidence to prove that the 
defendant acted with the specific intent. In the con-
text of drug distribution cases, this Court has stated 
time and again that prior distribution evidence can be 
admissible to show intent to distribute. Such evi-
dence is admissible where the past and present crime 
are related by being part of the same scheme of drug 
distribution or by having the same modus operandi. 
Such a relationship is required because the only way 
to reach the conclusion that the person currently has 
the intent to possess and distribute based solely on 
evidence of unrelated prior convictions for drug dis-
tribution is by employing the very kind of reason-
ing—i.e., once a drug dealer, always a drug dealer—
which 404(b) excludes.96 
                                                                                                             
 95 United States v. Mtola, 598 F. App’x 416, 420 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); accord Brewer, 860 F.3d at 825 n.25 (stating “Rule 
404(b)(2) includes an exception to the propensity evidence ban to demonstrate 
knowledge or lack of mistake”); United States v. Armstrong, 436 F. App’x 501, 
503 (6th Cir. 2011) (“There are, however, certain identified exceptions, including 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or ab-
sence of mistake or accident.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 96 Richardson, 597 F. App’x at 333–34 (citations, alterations, and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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Although it is likely that the court’s acceptance of a proper pur-
pose when the prior drug charges are related to the present charges 
still allows evidence of prior acts to be admitted even though based 
on a propensity inference, the court’s attention to the possibility that 
evidence offered for a specifically listed Rule 404(b)(2) purpose 
might nevertheless be inadmissible because it relies on “once a drug 
dealer, always a drug dealer” reasoning is a step in the right direc-
tion. 
c.  The “Intrinsic Evidence Exceptions” Heuristic 
The Sixth Circuit is one of the more egregious employers of the 
“intrinsic evidence exception” heuristic. The court often refers to 
“the intrinsic evidence exception to 404(b)”97 or to specific sub-
types of the “intrinsic evidence exception,” such as the “background 
evidence exception”98 and the “res gestae evidence exception.”99 
Even more troubling, however, is the court’s statement that “intrin-
sic” evidence is an “exception” not to the admission of other-acts 
evidence but to the admission of propensity evidence. For example, 
the court recently stated: “Res gestae evidence, also described as 
‘background’ or ‘intrinsic’ evidence, is ‘an exception’ to the Rule 
404(b) bar on propensity evidence.”100 
7.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
a.  The n-Factor Huddleston Heuristic 
The Seventh Circuit’s current approach, which explicitly rejects 
the n-factor Huddleston approach in favor of a more rule-based ap-
proach, is examined in Part III. 
                                                                                                             
 97 See, e.g., United States v. English, 785 F.3d 1052, 1059 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(citation omitted). 
 98 United States v. Heflin, 600 F. App’x 407, 411 (6th Cir. 2015) (“the back-
ground evidence exception”). 
 99 United States v. Hughes, 562 F. App’x 393, 396 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in determining that this other-acts evidence 
was intrinsic to the charged offenses and therefore came within the background 
or res gestae evidence exception to Rule 404(b).”). 
 100 United States v. Gibbs, 797 F.3d 416, 423 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation omit-
ted). 
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b.  The “Enumerated Exceptions” Heuristic 
The Seventh Circuit has a kind of Jekyll and Hyde approach to 
the list of permitted purposes. On one hand, the court often refers to 
the list as a set of enumerated exceptions.101 On the other hand, the 
court also recognizes the danger of regarding the list as having spe-
cial significance. For example, in one paragraph of a recent opinion, 
the Seventh Circuit referred to the “list” of permitted purposes as 
“an exception to the general rule of exclusion,” but then in the next 
paragraph cautioned that judges must be careful not to allow pro-
pensity evidence to be admitted under the guise of one of the listed 
purposes: 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404 addresses the subject 
of character evidence. Subpart (a) of the rule gener-
ally prohibits the admission of character evidence “to 
prove that on a particular occasion the person acted 
in accordance with the character or trait”—in other 
words, to show propensity. But subpart (b)(2) oper-
ates as an exception to the general rule of exclusion; 
it offers the following list of permitted uses of the 
character evidence: 
This evidence may be admissible for another pur-
pose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence 
of mistake, or lack of accident. 
                                                                                                             
 101 See United States v. Lee, 724 F.3d 968, 978 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The district 
judge must both identify the exception that applies to the evidence in question and 
evaluate whether the evidence, although relevant and within the exception, is suf-
ficiently probative to make tolerable the risk that jurors will act on the basis of 
emotion or an inference via the blackening of the defendant’s character.”) (cita-
tion omitted); United States v. Gulley, 722 F.3d 901, 907 n.2 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t 
is unnecessary for us to explain why the evidence at issue may have been admis-
sible under other Rule 404(b) exceptions, like identity or opportunity.”); United 
States v. Richards, 719 F.3d 746, 759 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating that “identification 
of an at-issue, non-propensity Rule 404(b) exception is a necessary condition for 
admitting the evidence”) (alterations and citation omitted); United States v. 
Curescu, 674 F.3d 735, 742 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The use of evidence of prior crimes 
to show ‘absence of mistake’ is an express exception to the prohibition of prior-
crimes evidence.”) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2)). 
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FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
We have expressed concern over the risk that practi-
cally anything can be shoehorned into this list of per-
mitted uses if the district court is not careful. A rule 
of de facto automatic admission would wipe out the 
general rule prohibiting propensity evidence.102 
The Gomez case has made the Seventh Circuit more focused on 
the proper application of Rule 404(b), but the court still adheres to 
the “enumerated exceptions” heuristic at least in form if not sub-
stance. For example, the court recently stated: “We have also been 
mindful that loose policing of Rule 404(b)’s exceptions historically 
appears in drug cases. Gomez, 763 F.3d at 853. The district court 
acted reasonably by accepting the Government’s reasoning centered 
around motive.”103 And even in Gomez, the court stated: “[T]he dis-
trict court must consider specifically how the prior conviction tends 
to serve the non-propensity exception.”104 
Of course, the recognition that simply invoking one of the “ex-
ceptions” is insufficient is a highly desirable development. How-
ever, it would have been even better—and no more difficult—for 
the court to state that that the district court must consider specifically 
how the prior conviction tends to serve the non-propensity purpose. 
At one point, the Gomez court does take care to explain that the ex-
amples of permitted purposes are not true exceptions: “A common 
misconception about Rule 404(b) is that it establishes a rule of ex-
clusion subject to certain exceptions. That’s not quite right.”105 
However, the value of this statement is undercut by its appearance 
in a footnote. The court further minimizes the importance of the 
statement by using the dismissive qualifier “technically”: “So it’s 
technically incorrect to characterize the purposes listed in subsection 
                                                                                                             
 102 United States v. McMillan, 744 F.3d 1033, 1037–38 (7th Cir. 2014) (cita-
tions omitted). 
 103 United States v. Ferrell, 816 F.3d 433, 447 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing United 
States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 853 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc)); accord United 
States v. Schmitt, 770 F.3d 524, 533 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating that “motive is an 
express exception to the Rule 404(b) bar”) (alteration and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 104 Gomez, 763 F.3d at 856 (citation and alterations omitted). 
 105 Id. at 855 n.3. 
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(2) as ‘exceptions’ to the rule of subsection (1).”106 But it’s not 
merely technically incorrect, it’s conceptually incorrect, to say that 
the examples of permitted purposes are exceptions. 
c.  The “Intrinsic Evidence Exceptions” Heuristic 
In the 2010 case United States v. Gorman, the Seventh Circuit 
explicitly rejected the “inextricably intertwined” approach to deter-
mining whether evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b): 
The inextricable intertwinement doctrine is based on 
the notion that evidence inextricably intertwined 
with charged conduct is, by its very terms, not other 
bad acts and therefore, does not implicate Rule 
404(b) at all. . . . . 
We have recently cast doubt on the continuing via-
bility of the inextricable intertwinement doctrine . . . . 
We again reiterate our doubts about the usefulness of 
the inextricable intertwinement doctrine, and again 
emphasize that direct evidence need not be admitted 
under this doctrine. If evidence is not direct evidence 
of the crime itself, it is usually propensity evidence 
simply disguised as inextricable intertwinement evi-
dence, and is therefore improper, at least if not ad-
mitted under the constraints of Rule 404(b). . . . . 
There is now so much overlap between the theories 
of admissibility that the inextricable intertwinement 
doctrine often serves as the basis for admission even 
when it is unnecessary. Thus, although this fine dis-
tinction has traditionally existed, the inextricable in-
tertwinement doctrine has since become overused, 
vague, and quite unhelpful. To ensure that there are 
no more doubts about the court’s position on this is-
sue—the inextricable intertwinement doctrine has 
                                                                                                             
 106 Id. 
740 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:706 
 
outlived its usefulness. Henceforth, resort to inextri-
cable intertwinement is unavailable when determin-
ing a theory of admissibility.107 
Despite this impressive assessment of the problems with the 
concept of “inextricably intertwined,” the Seventh Circuit still relies 
on some related “exceptions” heuristics. For example, the court re-
cently stated: 
The district court’s conclusion that the drug evidence 
was “inextricably intertwined” with the charged act 
and “filled the story” runs counter to our recent   
precedent and is not dispositive on the issue of rele-
vance or the ultimate admissibility of the drug evi-
dence. In the wake of several cases in which we ex-
pressed our criticism of such tongue-twisting formu-
las, we definitively concluded that “resort to inextri-
cable intertwinement is unavailable when determin-
ing a theory of admissibility.” United States v. Gor-
man, 613 F.3d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 2010). Instead, we 
focus our analysis on the government’s argument, 
and the district court’s additional reasoning, that the 
evidence was relevant to establish Schmitt’s motive 
for possessing a gun. Because motive is an express 
exception to the Rule 404(b) bar, there is no need to 
spread the fog of “inextricably intertwined” over 
it.108 
Rejecting the “inextricably intertwined exception” was a step in 
the right direction; rejecting related heuristics, such as the “motive 
exception” or the “absence of mistake exception,”109 would be an-
other step in the right direction. 
                                                                                                             
 107 613 F.3d 711, 717–19 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations and footnote omitted). 
 108 Schmitt, 770 F.3d at 533 (citations, alterations, and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 109 United States v. Curescu, 674 F.3d 735, 742 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The use of 
evidence of prior crimes to show ‘absence of mistake’ is an express exception to 
the prohibition of prior-crimes evidence.”) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2)). 
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8.  THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
a.  The n-Factor Huddleston Heuristic 
The Eighth Circuit applies a four-factor test to determine admis-
sibility under Rule 404(b): “Rule 404(b) evidence is admissible if it 
is (1) relevant to a material issue; (2) similar in kind and not overly 
remote in time to the crime charged; (3) supported by sufficient ev-
idence; and (4) higher in probative value than prejudicial effect.”110 
Like other circuits’ n-factor Huddleston tests, the Eighth Circuit’s 
approach tests for several non-404(b) issues—relevance (a Rule 402 
issue) and probative value weighed against unfair prejudice (a Rule 
403 issue)—but does not test for propensity reasoning. 
b.  The “Enumerated Exceptions” Heuristic 
Like most other circuits, the Eighth Circuit relies on 404(b)(2)’s 
listed “exceptions” to determine whether evidence is admissible. For 
example, the court has reasoned: 
We have held on many occasions that prior convic-
tions of firearm offenses are admissible to prove that 
the defendant had the requisite knowledge and intent 
to possess a firearm. . . . . 
Thus, under the initial Rule 404(b) analysis, our  
precedent indicates that previous firearm-related 
crimes can be relevant to prove that a defendant had 
the necessary knowledge that a firearm was present 
on or near his person and that a defendant had the 
intent to possess the firearm solely, jointly, or con-
structively.111 
Similarly, in a drug possession case, the court stated: “Fang’s 
prior convictions for possession are relevant because they go di-
rectly to proving knowledge.”112 
                                                                                                             
 110 United States v. Adams, 783 F.3d 1145, 1149 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 111 Id. at 1149–50 (citations and footnote omitted). 
 112 United States v. Fang, 844 F.3d 775, 780 (8th Cir. 2016). 
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c.  The “Intrinsic Evidence Exceptions” Heuristic 
The Eighth Circuit uses the typical “context” and “completes the 
story” definitions of intrinsic evidence. For example, the court re-
cently stated: “Intrinsic evidence includes both evidence that is in-
extricably intertwined with the crime charged as well as evidence 
that merely completes the story or provides context to the charged 
crime.”113 
9.  THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
a.  The n-Factor Huddleston Heuristic 
The Ninth Circuit’s Huddleston-based approach is discussed in 
Section II.A. 
b.  The “Enumerated Exceptions” Heuristic 
As previously discussed, the Ninth Circuit refers to the examples 
listed in Rule 404(b)(2) as having special powers as enumerated ex-
ceptions. For example, the court requires that the evidence fit “one 
of the exceptions”: “When the Government offers evidence of prior 
or subsequent crimes or bad acts as part of its case-in-chief, it has 
the burden of first establishing relevance of the evidence to prove a 
fact within one of the exceptions to the general exclusionary rule of 
Rule 404(b).”114 The court has also stated that Rule 404(b)(2) as a 
whole is an exception: “Rule 404(b)(2) functions as an exception to 
404(b)(1) . . . .”115 And the court refers to specifically-named excep-
tions, such as the “plan exception” and the “identity exception.”116 
                                                                                                             
 113 United States v. Cunningham, 702 F. App’x 489, 492 (8th Cir. 2017) (ci-
tation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 114 United States v. Wolverine, 584 F. App’x 646, 647 (9th Cir. 2014) (cita-
tions and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 115 United States v. McElmurry, 776 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2015); accord 
United States v. Goss, 256 F. App’x 122, 125 (9th Cir. 2007) (“FRE 404(b) sets 
forth exceptions to the general inadmissibility of propensity evidence, one of 
which is to prove knowledge, for which the district court allowed the evidence 
here.”). 
 116 United States v. Firempong, 624 F. App’x 497, 499 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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c.  The “Intrinsic Evidence Exceptions” Heuristic 
The Ninth Circuit also misuses the “intrinsic evidence excep-
tion” heuristic in several ways. One problem is the use of the “ex-
ception” language as a means of explaining why evidence is admis-
sible. For example, the court recently stated: “The uncharged trans-
actions were ‘intrinsic’ to the charged counts of wire fraud as they 
were all part of a single scheme; therefore, evidence of the un-
charged transactions was also admissible under the ‘inextricably in-
tertwined’ exception to Rule 404(b).”117 If the court is correct that 
the uncharged acts were intrinsic evidence of the charged acts, then 
the court’s further statement that the evidence is admissible because 
of “the ‘inextricably intertwined’ exception” is unnecessary. An-
other problem is the use of “inextricably intertwined” to cover a 
wide range of other-acts evidence, such as evidence needed to “com-
plete the story”118 or to provide “context.”119 As several other cir-
cuits have observed, these are purposes that have no natural outer 
boundary. 
10.  THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
a.  The n-Factor Huddleston Heuristic 
Under the Tenth Circuit’s four-factor Huddleston test: 
To determine whether Rule 404(b) evidence was 
properly admitted we look to the four-part test set out 
by the Supreme Court in Huddleston v. United States. 
To be admissible, this test requires that those fac-
                                                                                                             
 117 United States v. Cuenca, 692 F. App’x 857, 858 (9th Cir. 2017); accord 
United States v. Loftis, 843 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[E]vidence of the 
uncharged transactions falls under the first inextricably intertwined exception.”). 
 118 United States v. Iturbe-Gonzalez, 705 F. App’x 486, 488 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(“The 2015 arrest was not an ‘other act’ under Rule 404(b), but was necessary to 
tell the story of the charged crime and was thus inextricably intertwined with the 
conduct underlying the charged crime.”). 
 119 United States v. Bailey, 588 F. App’x 730, 731 (9th Cir. 2014) (“But even 
if Bailey did object, the evidence of other transactions between Bailey and Owens 
was ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the charged transactions and provided critical 
context about Bailey’s relationship with Owens, such that Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 404(b) does not apply.”) (citation omitted). 
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tors—often called the “Huddleston factors”—be sat-
isfied: (1) the evidence was offered for a proper pur-
pose under Rule 404(b); (2) the evidence was rele-
vant under Rule 401; (3) the probative value of the 
evidence was not substantially outweighed by its po-
tential for unfair prejudice under Rule 403; and (4) 
the district court, upon request, instructed the jury 
pursuant to Rule 105 to consider the evidence only 
for the purpose for which it was admitted.120 
Generally, the Tenth Circuit has interpreted the first factor to 
mean that the evidence was offered for one of Rule 404(b)(2)’s listed 
examples of permitted purposes: “Evidence is admitted for a proper 
purpose if allowed for one or more of the enumerated purposes in 
Rule 404(b).”121 Thus, this test has not required trial courts to deter-
mine whether the evidence is relevant only because of a propensity 
inference; it only requires that the evidence is relevant to one of the 
“enumerated” examples. 
b.  The “Enumerated Exceptions” Heuristic 
The Tenth Circuit also has made use of the “enumerated excep-
tions” heuristics. Interestingly, the court uses this kind of “excep-
tions” heuristic most often when characterizing a party’s argument 
rather than when presenting its own conclusions. For example, ap-
plying the “enumerated exceptions” heuristic, the court recently 
stated: “Mr. Harris objected to its admission, arguing that none of 
the exceptions to Rule 404(b) apply, since nothing related to the 
prior conviction shows plan, motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”122 
                                                                                                             
 120 United States v. Watson, 766 F.3d 1219, 1236 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting 
United States v. Becker, 230 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 2000)) (alterations and 
internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Henthorn, 864 F.3d 
1241, 1247–48 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Smalls, 752 F.3d 1227, 1237 
(10th Cir. 2014); United States v. Farr, 701 F.3d 1274, 1280 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 121 United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1156 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 122 United States v. Harris, 526 F. App’x 845, 849 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Cox, 684 F. App’x 706, 707 
(10th Cir. 2017) (“Cox ultimately conceded that evidence of her earlier metham-
phetamine transactions might qualify for admission under the Rule 404(b)(2) ex-
ception for evidence of a common plan or design between the charged crime and 
2018] THE (MIS)APPLICATION OF RULE 404(B) HEURISTICS 745 
 
c.  The “Intrinsic Evidence Exceptions” Heuristic 
The Tenth Circuit uses the “intrinsic evidence” heuristic to ad-
mit “inextricably intertwined” evidence, “background” evidence, 
and evidence of “necessary preliminaries” or “context.” The court 
recently provided this list of examples of cases in which it has found 
evidence to be “intrinsic”: 
We regard evidence as intrinsic when it [1] was “in-
extricably intertwined” with the charged conduct, [2] 
occurred within the same time frame as the activity 
in the conspiracy being charged, [3] was a necessary 
preliminary to the charged conspiracy, [4] provided 
direct proof of the defendant’s involvement with the 
charged crimes, [5] was entirely germane back-
ground information, directly connected to the factual 
circumstances of the crime, or [6] was necessary to 
provide the jury with background and context of the 
nature of the defendant’s relationship to his accom-
plice.123 
This list reflects not only the problem of a potentially infinitely 
expansive concept of “intertwined”—the problem that almost any 
other-act can in some way be connected to the charged act—but also 
the problem of unnecessary application of the heuristic. If evidence 
“provided direct proof of the defendant’s involvement with the 
charged crimes,” then that evidence was not just “intertwined” but 
actually was intrinsic evidence. 
11.  THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
a.  The n-Factor Huddleston Heuristic 
The Eleventh Circuit applies a four-part test to determine 
whether evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b): 
                                                                                                             
the extrinsic act.”); United States v. Bailey, 133 F. App’x 534, 537–38 (10th Cir. 
2005) (“Mr. Bailey argues that because the seizure of the paraphernalia took place 
11 months after the alleged conspiracy had terminated, the introduction of the 
evidence could not fall under the exceptions listed in Rule 404(b).”). 
 123 United States v. Kupfer, 797 F.3d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 2015) (footnotes 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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To be admissible under Rule 404(b), the evidence 
must be (1) relevant to an issue other than the defend-
ant’s character; (2) established by sufficient proof 
that the jury could find that the defendant committed 
the extrinsic act; and (3) of probative value that is not 
substantially outweighed by undue prejudice under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.124 
In applying this test, the court analyzes relevance at a very high 
level of generality and does not examine the specific chain of infer-
ences by which the evidence is relevant to determine whether the 
relevance is based upon a propensity inference. For example, the 
court has stated: 
Regarding the first prong of the Rule 404(b) test, a 
criminal defendant makes his intent relevant by 
pleading not guilty. Additionally, evidence that a de-
fendant engaged in similar behavior in the past 
makes it more likely that he did so knowingly, and 
not because of accident or mistake, on the current oc-
casion.125 
Similarly, the court has stated: “For the first prong—relevance 
to an issue other than character or propensity—where the state of 
mind required for the charged and extrinsic offenses is the same, the 
first prong of the Rule 404(b) test is satisfied.”126 
b.  The “Enumerated Exceptions” Heuristic 
Like all other circuits, the Eleventh Circuit has referred to the 
list of permitted purposes as exceptions; for example, the court has 
stated: “In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Nowak’s motion in limine because all of the challenged ev-
idence fell within the enumerated exceptions of Rule 404(b).”127 
                                                                                                             
 124 United States v. Gaskins, 685 F. App’x 698, 700 (11th Cir. 2017) (citation 
omitted). 
 125 United States v. Bush, 673 F. App’x 947, 950 (11th Cir. 2016) (citations 
omitted). 
 126 Gaskins, 685 F. App’x at 700 (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 127 United States v. Nowak, 370 F. App’x 39, 42 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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Although such a statement is incorrect, to the extent that there 
are no enumerated exceptions to Rule 404(b), even more problem-
atic is the Eleventh Circuit’s statement that the examples of permit-
ted purposes are exceptions to the inadmissibility of propensity evi-
dence—and not simply exceptions to the inadmissibility of other-
acts evidence. For example, the court has stated: “Rule 404(b)(1) 
generally prohibits the introduction of propensity evidence at trial. 
Rule 404(b)(2), however, provides an exception to this general rule 
for evidence that is also probative for some other purpose, such as 
proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”128 
c.  The “Intrinsic Evidence Exceptions” Heuristic 
Like most other circuits, the Eleventh Circuit uses the “intrinsic 
evidence exception” heuristic to admit a wide range of evidence. As 
the court has stated: 
Construing this exception, we have explained that 
evidence, not part of the crime charged but pertaining 
to events explaining the context, motive and set-up 
of the crime, is properly admitted if it forms an inte-
gral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is 
necessary to complete the crime’s story for the 
jury.129 
“Inextricably intertwined” evidence is also considered to be in-
trinsic, with “inextricably intertwined” defined essentially the same 
broad way: “Evidence is inextricably intertwined when it tends to 
corroborate, explain, or provide necessary context for evidence re-
garding the charged offense.”130 
                                                                                                             
 128 United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 237 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
 129 United States v. Louissaint, 407 F. App’x 378, 379 (11th Cir. 2011) (cita-
tion, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. 
Acosta, 660 F. App’x 749, 753 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Rule 404(b) does not apply 
where bad acts evidence concerns the ‘context, motive, and set-up of the crime’ 
and is ‘linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an in-
tegral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the 
story of the crime for the jury.”) (citation omitted). 
 130 Bush, 673 F. App’x at 950 (citation omitted). 
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12.  THE D.C. CIRCUIT 
a.  The n-Factor Huddleston Heuristic 
The D.C. Circuit follows a two-step test similar to the First and 
Fifth Circuits: 
The first step requires only that the evidence be pro-
bative of some material issue other than character. 
The second step requires that the evidence not be in-
admissible under any of the other general strictures 
limiting admissibility. The most important of these 
general strictures is Rule 403, which requires that the 
probative value of the evidence not be substantially 
outweighed by its potential prejudice.131 
b.  The “Enumerated Exceptions” Heuristic 
Like other circuit courts of appeals, the D.C. Circuit refers to the 
Rule 404(b)(2) list of examples of permitted purposes as “excep-
tions,” although it has stated that these “exceptions” are “narrow”: 
“This court has repeatedly emphasized the narrow scope of the ‘bad 
acts’ evidence exceptions under Rule 404(b) (such evidence may be 
used to prove ‘motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident’) . . . .”132 
The D.C. Circuit has invented several “exceptions” not directly 
borrowed from Rule 404(b)(2), including a “modus operandi excep-
tion” and a “common plan exception.” For example, the court has 
explained that “modus operandi” is a variant of the “identity excep-
tion”: “Although not listed in Rule 404(b)’s nonexclusive list of 
proper purposes, modus operandi evidence is normally admitted 
pursuant to the identity exception.”133 Regarding a “common plan 
exception,” the court has explained: 
One allowable purpose which traditionally has been 
stated as an exception to the “other crimes” rule, but 
                                                                                                             
 131 United States v. Washington, 969 F.2d 1073, 1080–81 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 132 United States v. Nicely, 922 F.2d 850, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citations omit-
ted). 
 133 United States v. Burwell, 642 F.3d 1062, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations 
omitted), aff’ d on reh’ g, 690 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
2018] THE (MIS)APPLICATION OF RULE 404(B) HEURISTICS 749 
 
which was not included in the Rule 404(b) list of ex-
amples, is to show the existence of “a common 
scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or 
more crimes so related to each other that proof of the 
one tends to establish the other.” . . . Although we 
can conceive of situations in which the parts of a 
common scheme or plan are more related than were 
the two crimes with which appellant was charged, we 
have no doubt that the evidence in this case fits 
within the common scheme exception to the “other 
crimes” rule.134 
c.  The “Intrinsic Evidence Exceptions” Heuristic 
The D.C. Circuit recognizes an “exception” for “inextricably in-
tertwined” evidence, although it has written at some length about the 
problems with such evidence, and has explicitly rejected some of the 
“inextricably intertwined” formulations recognized in other circuits, 
such as the “completes the story” exception: 
When evidence is “inextricably intertwined” with the 
charged crime, courts typically treat it as the same 
crime. Every circuit now applies some formulation 
of the inextricably intertwined “test.” . . . 
We have not defined “inextricably intertwined” in 
the few Rule 404(b) cases in which we used those 
terms. Our sister circuits have attempted various for-
mulations. . . . 
We do not find these formulations particularly help-
ful. Some are circular: inextricably intertwined evi-
dence is intrinsic, and evidence is intrinsic if it is in-
extricably intertwined. Others are over-broad. The 
“complete the story” definition of “inextricably in-
tertwined” threatens to override Rule 404(b). A de-
fendant’s bad act may be only tangentially related to 
                                                                                                             
 134 United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citations, 
footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the charged crime, but it nevertheless could “com-
plete the story” or “incidentally involve” the charged 
offense or “explain the circumstances.” If the prose-
cution’s evidence did not “explain” or “incidentally 
involve” the charged crime, it is difficult to see how 
it could pass the minimal requirement for admissibil-
ity that evidence be relevant. . . . 
We recognize that, at least in a narrow range of cir-
cumstances not implicated here, evidence can be “in-
trinsic to” the charged crime. . . . In other words, if 
the evidence is of an act that is part of the charged 
offense, it is properly considered intrinsic. In addi-
tion, some uncharged acts performed contemporane-
ously with the charged crime may be termed intrinsic 
if they facilitate the commission of the charged 
crime. 
On the other hand, we are confident that there is no 
general “complete the story” or “explain the circum-
stances” exception to Rule 404(b) in this Circuit. 
Such broad exclusions have no discernible ground-
ing in the “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” language 
of the rule. Rule 404(b), and particularly its notice 
requirement, should not be disregarded on such a 
flimsy basis.135 
In recent cases, the court has re-asserted that its “inextricably 
intertwined” exception is “narrow.” For example, the court recently 
stated: “It is true, as Clark argues, that we have rejected a ‘complete 
the story’ exception to Rule 404(b) and held that the ‘inextricably 
intertwined’ exception is narrow.”136 Similarly, the court has re-
peated its concerns about the over-breadth of the exception, stating: 
“If the government does attempt to introduce additional ‘other 
crimes’ evidence at a retrial, we encourage the district court to ad-
                                                                                                             
 135 United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 927–29 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal 
citations and footnotes omitted). 
 136 United States v. Clark, 747 F.3d 890, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Bowie, 
232 F.3d at 928–29). 
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dress Rule 404(b) before applying the inextricably intertwined doc-
trine, as there is a ‘danger that finding evidence “inextricably inter-
twined” may too easily slip from analysis to mere conclusion.’”137 
III.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S RULE 404(B) REPENTANCE AND 
REDEMPTION 
The Seventh Circuit recently acknowledged that its prior ap-
proach to Rule 404(b) had been misguided and proposed a different 
approach, focused on detecting and excluding evidence of propen-
sity. Prior to 2014, in determining whether evidence was admissible 
under Rule 404(b), the Seventh Circuit followed a four-factor test 
that was almost identical to the four-factor test that the Ninth Circuit 
currently follows. As the Seventh Circuit observed in the initial, 
three-judge panel opinion in United States v. Gomez: 
A court deciding whether to admit evidence under 
Rule 404(b) considers whether “(1) the evidence is 
directed toward establishing a matter in issue other 
than the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime 
charged, (2) the evidence shows that the other act is 
similar enough and close enough in time to be rele-
vant to the matter in issue, (3) the evidence is suffi-
cient to support a jury finding that the defendant 
committed the similar act, and (4) the probative value 
of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, as required by Rule 
403.”138 
Like the Ninth Circuit’s current test, this test admitted evidence 
as an “exception” to the rule prohibiting propensity evidence with-
out any consideration of whether the evidence’s relevance depended 
upon a propensity inference. For this very reason, the Seventh Cir-
cuit reheard the Gomez case en banc and set forth a more rule-based 
                                                                                                             
 137 United States v. Glover, 736 F.3d 509, 517 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Bowie, 232 F.3d at 928). 
 138 United States v. Gomez, 712 F.3d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting 
United States v. Albiola, 624 F.3d 431, 439 (7th Cir. 2010)), aff’ d on reh’ g, 763 
F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc); accord United States v. Boling, 648 F.3d 474, 
479 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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test for determining whether evidence of crimes, wrongs or other 
acts is admissible under Rule 404(b).139 
A.  Why the Four-Factor Test is Flawed 
The en banc Seventh Circuit explained at length why the four-
factor test did not adequately implement the core concern of Rule 
404(b), the concern that propensity evidence was likely to be over-
valued by fact-finders. The court began by acknowledging: 
Our four-part test for evaluating the admissibility of 
other-act evidence has ceased to be useful. We now 
abandon it in favor of a more straightforward rules-
based approach. This change is less a substantive 
modification than a shift in paradigm that we hope 
will produce clarity and better practice in applying 
the relevant rules of evidence.140 
The court then observed that what was wrong with the four-part 
test was it did not actually test for propensity.141 Specifically, the 
court explained: 
Rule 404(b) is not just concerned with the ultimate 
conclusion, but also with the chain of reasoning that 
supports the non-propensity purpose for admitting 
the evidence. In other words, the rule allows the use 
of other-act evidence only when its admission is sup-
ported by some propensity-free chain of reasoning. 
This is not to say that other-act evidence must be ex-
cluded whenever a propensity inference can be 
drawn; rather, Rule 404(b) excludes the evidence if 
its relevance to “another purpose” is established only 
through the forbidden propensity inference.142 
                                                                                                             
 139 United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“We 
reheard the case en banc to clarify the framework for admitting other-act evidence. 
We now conclude that our circuit’s four-part test should be replaced by an ap-
proach that more closely tracks the Federal Rules of Evidence.”). 
 140 Id. at 853. 
 141 Id. at 855. 
 142 Id. at 856 (citations omitted). 
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The court noted that it is not enough for a trial court to determine 
that evidence of crimes, wrongs, or other acts is relevant to an issue 
such as motive, plan, or identity; instead, trial courts must further 
determine whether that relevance is based upon “a hidden propen-
sity inference.”143 Therefore, before deciding that evidence is ad-
missible, 
the district court should not just ask whether the pro-
posed other-act evidence is relevant to a non-propen-
sity purpose but how exactly the evidence is relevant 
to that purpose—or more specifically, how the evi-
dence is relevant without relying on a propensity in-
ference. Careful attention to these questions will help 
identify evidence that serves no permissible pur-
pose.144 
B.  The New, Propensity-Focused Test of Propensity 
In Gomez, the Seventh Circuit replaced its four-part Huddleston 
test with what it characterized as a “rules-based framework.”145 This 
approach seeks to simply apply Rule 404(b) without any four-part 
heuristics. Like the law student who realizes that she cannot obtain 
a full and accurate understanding of a case from her outlines and 
supplements and decides that the best way to understand the case is 
by focusing on the case itself, the Seventh Circuit has decided that 
the best approach to Rule 404(b) is found in the rule itself. As the 
court stated: 
Multipart tests are commonplace in our law and can 
be useful, but sometimes they stray or distract from 
the legal principles they are designed to implement; 
over time misapplication of the law can creep in. This 
is especially regrettable when the law itself provides 
                                                                                                             
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 850 (“We now conclude that our circuit’s four-part test should be 
replaced by an approach that more closely tracks the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Applying a rules-based framework here . . . .”). 
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a clear roadmap for analysis, as the Federal Rules of 
Evidence generally do.146 
What the Seventh Circuit requires for admission of other-acts 
evidence under Gomez is what Rule 404(b) requires: evidence that 
is not offered to prove propensity; or as the court stated, what is re-
quired is “a chain of reasoning that does not rely on the forbidden 
inference that the person has a certain character and acted in accord-
ance with that character on the occasion charged in the case.”147 
C.  Post-Gomez Rule 404(b) in the Seventh Circuit 
In one way, the en banc decision in Gomez dramatically changed 
how federal courts in the Seventh Circuit apply Rule 404(b). It is no 
longer sufficient to determine that evidence of other-acts “fits” an 
“exception.”148 However, the practical effect of Gomez has been 
more difficult to assess. Shortly after the en banc Gomez decision, 
Judge Easterbrook suggested: “Prosecutors who do not understand 
and apply the full scope of the Gomez decision will find their con-
victions hard to sustain on appeal.”149 However, subsequent cases 
have shown that Gomez has not made affirming criminal convictions 
so difficult after all. Of course, in some cases, the Seventh Circuit 
has found that other-acts evidence was admitted in error. In many of 
these cases, though, the error has been found to be harmless.150 And 
                                                                                                             
 146 Id. at 853. 
 147 Id. at 860. 
 148 Id. at 855 n.3. 
 149 United States v. Lawson, 776 F.3d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 150 See, e.g., United States v. Seals, 813 F.3d 1038, 1044 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Re-
garding Seals’ conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, there can 
be no doubt that any error regarding 404(b) evidence was harmless.”); Lawson, 
776 F.3d at 522 (“As for this appeal, however: We’ve already stressed that Law-
son’s best potential arguments are not presented for decision, and now we add that 
any error was harmless.”); United States v. Curtis, 781 F.3d 904, 911 (7th Cir. 
2015) (“The court did not expressly engage in that analysis on the record here, but 
any error was harmless.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Stacy, 769 F.3d 
969, 976 (7th Cir. 2014) (“As in Gomez, the government’s case here was strong, 
and the district court’s error in admitting the evidence of prior acts under Rule 
404(b) was harmless.”); United States v. Clark, 774 F.3d 1108, 1116 (7th Cir. 
2014); United States v. Schmitt, 770 F.3d 524, 538 (7th Cir. 2014); cf. Viramontes 
v. City of Chicago, 840 F.3d 423, 431 (7th Cir. 2016) (civil case; error but not 
reversible error). 
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in many other cases, the admission of the evidence has been found 
to have been proper.151 Even after Gomez, it remains the rare case in 
which a conviction is reversed.152 
Although Gomez appears not to have altered the outcome of 
many cases, the Rule 404(b) test adopted in Gomez is nevertheless 
an improvement over the prior, multi-factor test with its assorted 
exceptions. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis is clear: did 
the district court articulate a non-propensity reason for admitting the 
evidence?153 And district courts’ rulings on pre-trial motions to ad-
mit or exclude other-acts evidence are similarly straightforward: has 
the proponent of the evidence articulated a non-propensity reason 
for admitting the evidence?154 Not only are these inquiries clearer 
and more straightforward, they also succeed in effectuating the 
words of Rule 404(b). For example, Judge St. Eve of the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently 
wrote: 
Plaintiff contends that prior, similar acts by police of-
ficers are admissible as other-act evidence showing 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or acci-
dent. Plaintiff, however, may not “simply to point to 
a purpose in the ‘permitted’ list and assert that the 
other-act evidence is relevant to it.” Gomez, 763 F.3d 
at 856. Other-act evidence may be admitted “only 
when its admission is supported by some propensity-
free chain of reasoning.” Id. Plaintiff, however, has 
failed to establish a propensity-free chain of reason-
ing for why similar acts in the past would be relevant 
                                                                                                             
 151 United States v. Mabie, 862 F.3d 624, 633 (7th Cir. 2017) (“There is no 
credible argument that the government failed to comply with Gomez’s require-
ments.”), petition for cert. filed, No. 17-7935 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2018); United States 
v. Carson, 870 F.3d 584, 603 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Gonzalez, 863 F.3d 
576, 589 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Urena, 844 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir. 
2016); United States v. Ferrell, 816 F.3d 433, 446 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Gomez makes 
no difference in the outcome”); United States v. Anzaldi, 800 F.3d 872, 882 (7th 
Cir. 2015) (“The propensity-free chain of reasoning is clear.”); United States v. 
Vance, 764 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 152 See, e.g., United States v. Chapman, 765 F.3d 720, 723 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 153 Gomez, 763 F.3d at 860. 
 154 Id. 
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to a permitted purpose. . . . The Court therefore grants 
Defendant’s motion.155 
Prior to Gomez, the district court might well have considered 
whether the plaintiff’s proffered evidence met one of the “enumer-
ated” “exceptions” of “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” In-
stead, following Gomez, the district court clearly and straightfor-
wardly considered whether the plaintiff had offered a propensity-
free reason for admitting the evidence.156 Because the plaintiff had 
not, the evidence was excluded.157 Similarly, in a recent case decid-
ing that the other-acts evidence was admissible, Judge Ellis wrote: 
Llufrio first challenges Bustamante’s testimony 
about a small drug transaction between Bustamante 
and Llufrio, which the Court admitted and which 
Lllufrio claims prejudiced him at his drug trafficking 
trial . . . . The Government argued that the testimony 
helped prove that Llufrio had knowledge that he was 
involved with someone who was a cocaine dealer, 
Bustamante, and that drugs were in the truck that 
Llufrio drove for Bustamante. The Government’s 
theory was not relevant to Llufrio’s character or pro-
pensity for using cocaine or trafficking drugs. Fur-
ther, the Government’s theory did not rely on Llu-
frio’s character or propensity for using cocaine—the 
testimony tended to show Llufrio knew that Busta-
mante was a cocaine dealer and that the truck was 
carrying drugs solely because Llufrio knew that 
Bustamante could afford to give cocaine away for 
free and could do so in the same time and proximity 
as Llufrio’s driving work for Bustamante. Finally, 
although the risk of prejudice for Llufrio’s cocaine 
                                                                                                             
 155 Harris v. City of Chicago, No. 14-CV-4391, 2017 WL 2462197, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. June 7, 2017). 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
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use was high, especially in a trial regarding drug traf-
ficking of cocaine, the risk did not outweigh the pro-
bative value.158 
D.  Post-Gomez Rule 404(b) in Other Circuits 
1.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT APPROACH AS AN EXAMPLE 
Further evidence of the desirability of the Seventh Circuit’s ap-
proach is that fellow circuit courts are following its example. The 
Tenth Circuit has directly cited to Gomez, stating: “Rule 404(b) is 
concerned ‘with the chain of reasoning that supports the non-pro-
pensity purpose for admitting the evidence,’ and it ‘allows the use 
of other-act evidence only when its admission is supported by some 
propensity-free chain of reasoning.’”159 Other circuits have cited 
other Seventh Circuit cases, especially United States v. Miller,160 a 
pre-Gomez case that called attention to the issue of Rule 404(b) by 
reversing a criminal conviction because of improperly admitted 
                                                                                                             
 158 United States v. Llufrio, No. 15 CR 703, 2017 WL 3276860, at *1–2 (N.D. 
Ill. Aug. 2, 2017). 
 159 United States v. Rodella, 804 F.3d 1317, 1333 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Gomez, 763 F.3d at 856). See also United States v. Edmond, 815 F.3d 1032, 1045 
(6th Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1577 (2017); United States v. Burnett, 827 
F.3d 1108, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 160 673 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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other-acts evidence.161 These other circuits that have cited Miller in-
clude the Third,162 the Fourth,163 the Sixth,164 and the Eighth.165 
2.  IS EN BANC REVIEW REQUIRED? 
One reason why other circuits are citing Miller—a three-judge 
panel decision—more often than Gomez—the decision of the en 
banc court—is to avoid the question whether a three-judge panel has 
the authority to embrace the Seventh Circuit’s approach. Recently, 
Judge Browning of the District of New Mexico suggested that the 
district court cannot formally follow the Gomez approach until the 
Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, overrules the circuit’s current four-
factor Huddleston test: 
Because “only the en banc court can overrule the 
judgment of a prior panel,” this four-part test binds 
the Tenth Circuit—and, most importantly here, all 
district courts within the Tenth Circuit—until the 
Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, rules otherwise, see 
                                                                                                             
 161 The court explained: 
Miller’s prior conviction for possession of cocaine with intent 
to distribute shows he once had an intent to distribute 
drugs. . . . The relevance of the prior conviction here boils down 
to the prohibited “once a drug dealer, always a drug dealer” ar-
gument. A prosecutor who wants to use prior bad acts evidence 
must come to court prepared with a specific reason, other than 
propensity, why the evidence will be probative of a disputed 
issue that is permissible under Rule 404(b). Mere recitation that 
a permissible Rule 404(b) purpose is “at issue” does not suffice. 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that the admission of the details 
of Miller’s 2000 conviction was an abuse of the district court’s 
discretion. . . . 
 
Miller’s convictions for possession with intent to distribute and 
for possession of a firearm in furtherance of that crime are 
REVERSED. 
Id. at 700–02 (citation omitted). 
 162 See, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 282 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 163 See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254, 269 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 164 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 597 F. App’x 328, 336 (6th Cir. 
2015). 
 165 See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 781 F.3d 374, 390 (8th Cir. 2015). 
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Stephen A. Saltzburg, Professor, George Washing-
ton University Law School, The Second Best Federal 
Bar Seminar Ever: Evidence (May 1, 2015) (noting 
that United States Courts of Appeals must go en banc 
to change their four-part tests). Moreover, the Tenth 
Circuit, and every United States Court of Appeals 
with a four-part test, derived its test from the “four-
step framework” that the Supreme Court set forth in 
Huddleston v. United States.166 
It is true that within a circuit, a three-judge panel cannot overrule 
another three-judge panel, and thus it is also true that changing es-
tablished law within a circuit requires a decision of the court en 
banc.167 However, it is possible to argue that the approach adopted 
in Gomez was not an overruling of any previous Seventh Circuit de-
cision but rather a reframing of its previous approach to applying 
Rule 404(b). 
The en banc Gomez Court itself characterized its decision as a 
reframing: “We reheard the case en banc to clarify the framework 
for admitting other-act evidence. We now conclude that our circuit’s 
four-part test should be replaced by an approach that more closely 
tracks the Federal Rules of Evidence. Applying a rules-based frame-
work here . . . .”168 
Several three-judge panels of the Third Circuit have taken this 
reframing approach. For example, as one Third Circuit decision ex-
plained, citing Miller: 
The reason we require the proponent and the court to 
articulate a logical chain of inferences connecting the 
                                                                                                             
 166 United States v. Folse, 163 F. Supp. 3d 898, 912 n.7 (D.N.M. 2015) (cita-
tion omitted). The same language appears in at least three other cases by Judge 
Browning: Leon v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 313 F.R.D. 615, 625 n.2 
(D.N.M. 2016); United States v. Chapman, No. CR 14-1065 JB, 2015 WL 
4461243, at *8 n.4 (D.N.M. July 15, 2015); Upky v. Lindsey, No. CIV 13-0553 
JB/GBW, 2015 WL 3862944, at *10 n.3 (D.N.M. June 3, 2015). 
 167 See Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of 
Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 693, 699 n.20 (1995) (stat-
ing that “all courts of appeals follow a rule under which panel decisions are bind-
ing on later panels unless overruled by the Supreme Court or by the court of ap-
peals en banc”). 
 168 United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
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evidence to a non-propensity purpose is because we 
must assure that the evidence is not susceptible to be-
ing used improperly by the jury. Another way to 
frame this requirement is to ask the prosecution to 
explain “exactly how the proffered evidence should 
work in the mind of a juror to establish the fact the 
government claims to be trying to prove.” Miller, 673 
F.3d at 699. Framed this way, the flaw in the evi-
dence proffered in this case becomes apparent.169 
CONCLUSION 
The Rule 404(b) heuristics that the federal circuit courts of ap-
peals have created should be abandoned. Huddleston v. United 
States was not about determining whether evidence was offered for 
the improper purpose of proving propensity. And there are no ex-
ceptions to Rule 404(b), which prohibits the admission of evidence 
for the purpose of proving propensity—without exception. The Sev-
enth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Gomez sets an example 
that other circuit courts of appeals have started—and should con-
tinue—to follow. 
                                                                                                             
 169 United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 282 (3d Cir. 2014). 
